The Constitution, through the Fourth Amendment, protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. The Fourth Amendment, however, is not a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only those that are deemed unreasonable under the law.
Whether a particular type of search is considered reasonable in the eyes of the law, is determined by balancing two important interests. On one side of the scale is the intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. On the other side of the scale are legitimate government interests, such as public safety.
The extent to which an individual is protected by the Fourth Amendment depends, in part, on the location of the search or seizure. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
Home
Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
However, there are some exceptions. A warrantless search may be lawful:
If an officer is given consent to search; Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946)
If the search is incident to a lawful arrest; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
If there is probable cause to search and exigent circumstances; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)
If the items are in plain view; Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
A Person
When an officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot, the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)
Schools
School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their
authority; rather, a search of a student need only be reasonable under all the circumstances.
New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
Cars
Where there is probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of a criminal activity, an officer may lawfully search any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009),
An officer may conduct a traffic stop if he has reasonable suspicion
that a traffic violation has occurred or that criminal activity is afoot.
Berekmer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984),
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
An officer may conduct a pat-down of the driver and passengers during a lawful traffic stop; the police need not believe that any occupant of the vehicle is involved in a criminal activity.
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009).
The use of a narcotics detection dog
to walk around the exterior of a car subject to a valid traffic stop does not require reasonable, explainable suspicion.
Illinois v. Cabales, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
Special law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify highway stops without any individualized suspicion.
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
An officer at an international border may conduct routine stops and searches.
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531 (1985).
A state may use highway sobriety checkpoints for the purpose of combating drunk driving.
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
A state may set up highway checkpoints where the stops are brief and seek voluntary cooperation in the investigation of a recent crime that has occurred on that highway.
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
However, a state may not use a highway checkpoint
program whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
DISCLAIMER: These resources are created by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts for educational purposes only. They may not reflect the current state of the law, and are not intended to provide legal advice, guidance on litigation, or commentary on any pending case or legislation.
Annotation
Primary Holding
A claim of excessive force by law enforcement during an arrest, stop, or other seizure of an individual is subject to the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment, rather than a substantive due process standard under the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, the facts and circumstances related to the use of force should drive the analysis, rather than any improper intent or motivation by the officer who used force.
Facts
When a diabetic patient began to experience an insulin reaction, he asked a friend to drive him to a convenience store to buy orange juice. Since the store was crowded when he arrived, the patient felt that he would not get the orange juice in time and asked his friend to drive him to another individual's house. A police officer noticed the patient leaving the store soon after he entered it and followed the friend's car. The officer eventually stopped the vehicle and ordered the patient and the friend to wait while he investigated what happened in the store. Other police officers handcuffed the patient after arriving at the scene, while failing to investigate or address his medical condition. The patient was injured during these events, but the original officer released him after some time had passed when he found out that no crime had occurred in the store.
Opinions
Majority
- William Hubbs Rehnquist (Author)
- Byron Raymond White
- John Paul Stevens
- Sandra Day O'Connor
- Antonin Scalia
- Anthony M. Kennedy
- Harry Andrew Blackmun
- William Joseph Brennan, Jr.
- Thurgood Marshall
Writing for a unanimous Court, Rehnquist ruled that an analysis of an excessive force claim should consider whether the search or seizure was objectively reasonable, based on how a reasonable police officer would have handled the same situation. The specific intent of the individual police officer who executed the search or seizure should not matter. While improper intentions do not make a reasonable use of force unconstitutional, good intentions do not shield an officer from liability if their use of force was objectively unreasonable. Thus, the Supreme Court rejected both the decisions of lower courts that had relied on the 14th Amendment and arguments that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment should apply. (An Eighth Amendment standard also would be subjective.)
In deciding whether an officer used excessive force in a certain situation, a court should consider similar factors to those described in the earlier decision of Tennessee v. Garner. These include the severity of the crime, any threat posed by the individual to the safety of officers or other people, and whether the individual is trying to flee or resist arrest.
Case Commentary
This case helped shape police procedures for stops that involve the use of force. An officer cannot justify these actions based on a hunch or by showing that they acted in good faith. Instead, they must carefully articulate facts and events that made their use of force objectively reasonable under the circumstances.