The peoples of Korea and the Philippines have suffered significant U.S. intervention in their affairs throughout the twentieth century: at the beginning when the U.S. government was engaged in a policy of colonization; at mid-century when the U.S. military interventions of the Second World War merged into those of the Cold War; in the 1960s and 1970s when U.S. Cold War policy led to the Vietnam war, and in the 1980s when the Cold War was coming to an end. Show These interventions have occurred almost simultaneously in the two countries and usually have taken similar forms, suggesting a common U.S. policy. Although the forms of these interventions have changed with changing circumstances, their purpose remained constant: promoting the economic and military interests of the ruling class of the United States. Colonization At the beginning of the twentieth century the United States and Japan came late to the race for colonial territory that had occupied the major European powers for the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Since so much of the world had already been claimed by Europe when they came on the scene, the United States and Japan followed a similar course: defeating weaker powers and taking over their colonies. In 1898, the United States vanquished Spain and took over the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. But before the United States established its colonial rule in the Philippines it conducted a harsh war of conquest against Philippine nationalists, leaving some 600,000 dead on the island of Luzon alone. In 1895, Japan defeated China and took over Manchuria and Korea as spheres of influence. Tsarist Russia began to challenge Japanese ascendancy in these areas, but was defeated by Japan in 1905 in a war that once more brought Korea under Japanese control. Japan encountered bitter nationalist resistance as it began to exercise its sway in Korea, as did the United States in the Philippines. As both powers were consolidating their newly acquired dominions at the same time, they signed what became known as the Taft-Katsura agreement, which stipulated that the United States would recognize and not interfere with Japanese suzerainty in Korea and Japan would reciprocate in the Philippines. In this way the two budding imperialist powers secured their flanks from one another in order to concentrate on bringing their newly acquired subjects under control. In Korea, the Japanese set up an autocratic rule, whereas in the Philippines the United States used certain democratic forms, including a Philippine congress, elected by voters with property qualifications. The U.S. colonial intervention in the Philippines lasted from 1899 to 1946 (save for three years of Japanese occupation during the Second World War), while Japan ruled Korea from 1905 to 1945. Three additional interventions in both countries extend from the 1950s to the present. The Cold War In the final stages of the Second World War the United States intervened to secure the defeat of Japanese rule in both the Philippines and Korea. In the former, the U.S. military and Philippine guerrilla forces carried... Get Full Access Gale offers a variety of resources for education, lifelong learning, and academic research. Log in through your library to get access to full content and features! At the seventieth anniversary of the Korean War, I would like to highlight the critical misperceptions and misjudgment by both Beijing and Washington in the making of the Korean War and how the conflict evolved into a prolonged Chinese-American confrontation. The first such misjudgment was made by Stalin and Mao Zedong in the wake of US secretary of state Dean Acheson’s January 1950 statement excluding Korea from America’s western Pacific defense perimeter. At the end of January 1950, Stalin, for the first time in many months, gave Kim Il Sung the green light to use military mean to unify the Korean peninsula. In March, during a meeting between Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Ri Ju-yon, North Korea’s ambassador to China, Mao stated: “The unification of Korea cannot be realized in a peaceful way; the unification of Korea must be realized by using force. As for the Americans, do not fear them. The Americans will not start the third world war for such a small place.” When Mao made this statement, he was mindful that Chinese military planners had already concluded that, at least for five years, it was unlikely for the United States to involve militarily in a revolutionary civil war in East Asia. Obviously, this was a misjudgment that contributed to the outbreak of the Korean War. The Americans also had their own share of critical misperception and misjudgment. In October 1950, when the UN/US troops carried out an sweeping counteroffensive after the Inchon landing, approaching and, then, crossing the 38 parallel, Zhou Enlai used explicit language to warn Washington that if UN/US forces’ advance in Korea continued, “We will intervene.” However, US policymakers and military planners dismissed Zhou’s warnings as “bluffing.” This was not due to an intelligence failure. Actually, since late summer, US intelligence services had known well about Chinese military deployments along the Yalu River. Yet US policymakers did not take this information seriously. They paid more attention to Soviet military movement (or lack of it) in the Far East. When they found little evidence of Soviet willingness to intervene in the war, they concluded that it was less likely that a full-scale Chinese intervention in Korea would occur. In retrospect, Washington’s policymakers were deeply convinced that China, so backward and so weak, would not dare to fight a war against powerful America. Mao was genuinely offended. Compared with American hostility toward China, what was more furious and enraging to Mao and his fellow Chinese leaders was the perceived American disdain of China and the Chinese as backward and, indeed, inferior. It is little wonder that Mao, in addition to his other goals, hoped to use a Chinese victory in Korea to “beat American arrogance.” But Mao’s desire turned out to be the source of another critical misperception and misjudgment, on his part, that prolonged the Chinese-American war in Korea. China’s massive intervention in Korea caught General Douglas MacArthur by total surprise. By early 1951, the situation on the Korean battlefield had reversed. The Chinese troops were on the offensive with the aim of “kicking the Americans into the Pacific Ocean.” In mid-January, 13 non-Western countries headed by India proposed an immediate ceasefire in Korea, which would be followed by foreign troops withdrawing from Korea and the convening of a four-power (the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and China) meeting to settle outstanding Far East issues, including the Taiwan question and the PRC’s representation in the UN. In hindsight, this proposal might have offered Beijing a golden opportunity to end the war at the right moment. By then, although the Chinese had made substantial gains on the battlefield, their offensive potential had been exhausted due to their overextended supply lines, lack of air support, and heavy casualties. An immediate ceasefire would have allowed the Chinese forces to hold in place and, if the ceasefire failed, offered them a desirable break to rebuild their offensive momentum. Further, the Chinese acceptance of this proposal would certainly have placed Washington in a “diplomatic dilemma” (in Acheson’s words): supporting the proposal could result in “the loss of the Koreans and the fury of Congress and the press” while rejecting it could lead to “the loss of our majority and support in the United Nations.” Washington made the smart decision to support the proposal, calculating that Beijing would reject it. The Chinese, as expected, indeed turned down the proposal. Mao and his comrades were overenthusiastic about changing China’s “glorious victory” in Korea into a powerful source of excessive domestic mobilization on Mao’s terms. What they got, however, was a bloody and costly Chinese-American war in Korea that rage on for another two and a half years. In addition to its profound international and peninsula origins, the Korean War was made and prolonged by misperceptions and misjudgment. This is among the most salient lessons to be learned from this history, especially as US-China relations are today at another critical historical juncture replete of possibilities of fatal misperceptions and misjudgments. Why did the US want to intervene in Korea?America wanted not just to contain communism - they also wanted to prevent the domino effect. Truman was worried that if Korea fell, the next country to fall would be Japan, which was very important for American trade. This was probably the most important reason for America's involvement in the war.
Why did the US get involved in Korea in the 1950s?On June 27, 1950, President Truman ordered U.S. forces to South Korea to repulse the North's invasion. “Democrats needed to look tough on communism,” Kim says. “Truman used Korea to send a message that the U.S. will contain communism and come to the aid of their allies.”
Why did the US get involved in the Korean War quizlet?Why did the U.S get involved in the Korean War? Primarily because of the threat of Communist expansion by China, along with fear that the SU was working with China to create bombs. Plus, Korea was positioned at the 38th Parallel, which makes it an important point to hold in the area for political control.
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