journal article Show Public Affairs Quarterly Vol. 5, No. 1 (Jan., 1991) , pp. 101-115 (15 pages) Published By: University of Illinois Press https://www.jstor.org/stable/40435772
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Journal Information Public Affairs Quarterly (PAQ) is devoted to current issues in social and political philosophy. It specializes in contributions that examine matters on the current agenda of public policy in light of philosophical reflections and assessments. The journal offers tightly focused philosophical case studies of particular issues in such areas as social and economic justice; public welfare; individual entitlements, rights, and duties; inheritance, taxation, and distributive justice in general; population policy, abortion, and euthanasia; environmental problems; science policy; the social and political status of women, senior citizens, minorities, and other social groups; arms control, war and deterrence; loyalty, duty, and patriotism; ethical issues in medicine, business, and the professions; criminality, criminal justice, and punishment; and similar topics. Publisher Information The University of Illinois Press is one of the leading publishers of humanities and social sciences journals in the country. Founded in 1918, the Press publishes more than 40 journals representing 18 societies, along with more than 100 new books annually. Our publication program covers a wide range of disciplines including psychology, philosophy, Black studies, women's studies, cultural studies, music, immigration, and more. Current issues are available through the Scholarly Publishing Collective. The Press is a founding member of the Association of University Presses. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. journal article Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years after the Judges' BillColumbia Law Review Vol. 100, No. 7 (Nov., 2000) , pp. 1643-1738 (96 pages) Published By: Columbia Law Review Association, Inc. https://doi.org/10.2307/1123589 https://www.jstor.org/stable/1123589 Read and download Log in through your school or library Read Online (Free) relies on page scans, which are not currently available to screen readers. To access this article, please contact JSTOR User Support. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.With a personal account, you can read up to 100 articles each month for free. Get StartedAlready have an account? Log in Monthly Plan
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Abstract We tend to take for granted that the United States Supreme Court has the discretionary power, through its use of the writ of certiorari, to select the cases it wishes to decide. The Court, however, has not always possessed this discretion. Professor Hartnett traces the history of certiorari in the Court, paying particular attention to the unprecedented efforts of Chief Justice William Howard Taft to promote the landmark Judges' Bill of 1925 and the uncritical deference to the Court shown by Congress in enacting it. After describing ways in which the Court asserted even broader discretion than Congress provided, Professor Hartnett questions whether certiorari is consistent with the traditional conceptions of judicial review, the nature of judicial power, and the rule of law. While questioning certiorari, he emphasizes its importance not only in encouraging Supreme Court Justices to think of themselves as final arbiters of controversial questions but also in shaping substantive constitutional law. Journal Information Founded in 1901, the Columbia Law Review is a leader in legal scholarship in the United States and around the world. The Review is an independent nonprofit corporation edited and published entirely by students at Columbia Law School. Published eight times a year, the Review is the third most widely distributed and cited law review in the country, receiving close to 1,500 submissions yearly from which approximately 25 manuscripts are chosen for publication. Publisher Information The Columbia Law Review is one of the world’s leading publications of legal scholarship. Founded in 1901, the Review is an independent nonprofit corporation that produces a law journal edited and published entirely by students at Columbia Law School. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. What is Hamilton's main concern in Federalist 78?Legislative review of judicial decisions
The primary point of contention between Hamilton and Brutus was in the concern that judges would substitute their will for the plain text of the Constitution, as exemplified by the Supreme Court's de facto revision of the Eleventh Amendment.
What are the main arguments in anti Federalist 78?Publius in The Federalist 78 suggested that having judicial review was advantageous because it afforded federal judges “an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humours in the society.” Antifederalist Brutus argued that federal judges would be “independent of the people, of the legislature, and of ...
What is the main point of Federalist 78 quizlet?78. Express the necessity for judicial branch while focusing on structure and power within branch.
What is Hamilton argument for judicial review in Federalist No 78?In 1788, in the 78th paper of “The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton argued for judicial review by an independent judiciary as a necessary means to void all governmental actions contrary to the Constitution.
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